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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
EMINENT DOMAIN: COMPENSATION FOR LEASEHOLD
INTEREST WHERE NO PROVISION IN LEASE
I. INTRODUCTION
When a state or the federal government exercises its power of
eminent domain, it must compensate the person whose property is taken
or damaged. Compensation must not only be made to the land owner, but
to every person with an interest in the condemned property. Among
those persons with a compensable interest is the lessee. In many cases,
the lease itself will provide for the amount or method of compensation
to be paid the tenant when his leasehold is taken. This article will discuss
the methods of compensation where there is no such provision in the
lease.
Eminent domain is the inherent right of the sovereign to take or
authorize the taking of private property for public use.1 It is an inalien-
able power,2 vested in the governing body, to take private property
without the owner's consent, 3 and use it for the public benefit.4 The
power does not emanate from constitution or statute, but is limited and
conditioned thereby.5 The limits generally placed upon the power are
that the taking must be for public use and that compensation must
be made. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires "just compensation" when the power of eminent domain is ex-
ercised by the federal government,6 and this same requirement has been
carried over into the constitutions of all of the states. 7 Private property
cannot be taken for public use without just and adequate compensation
therefor.8
II. THE INTERESTS INVOLVED AND THE DETERMINATION
OF JUST COMPENSATION
In considering the application of these constitutional provisions, we
must first determine what the word "property" encompasses and what
constitutes a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment and
the various state constitutions. Under the fifth amendment to the federal
constitution, the word "property" denotes a group of rights inhering
in the citizen's relation to a physical thing, such as the right to possess,
use, and dispose thereof. This constitutional provision is addressed to
' Glover v. State Highway Comm'n, 147 Kan. 279, 77 P. 2d 189 (1938) ; High-
way Comm. v. Guist, 235 Wis. 18, 292 N.W. 226 (1940).
2 Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 219 N.W. 428 (1928).
3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 270 Ill. 399, 110 N.E. 583,
589 (1915).4 Filbin Corp. v. United States, 265 Fed. 354, (E.D. S.C. 1920).
5 Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., supra note 2. See also United
States v. Parcel of Land, 100 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1951).6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
7 WIs. CONST. art. I, § 3: "The property of no person shall be taken without
just compensation therefor."
8 Sioux City v. Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W. 510 (1953) ; Scorsune v. State,
224 La. 1031, 71 So. 2d 557 (1954).
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every sort of interest the citizen may possess.9 Originally, the term
"property" was limited to the tangible thing itself,10 but now it is gen-
erally held to include all essential elements of ownership;"' i.e., leaseholds,
easements, etc.' 2 It has been said that a "taking" by condemnation under
the right of eminent domain includes every interference with owner-
ship, possession, enjoyment, or value of private property."3 The taking
occurs when the entity clothed with the power of eminent domain sub-
stantially deprives the owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property.14 An actual, physical taking is not required, only an interference
with an individual's property rights.'
As mentioned above, the fifth amendment to the federal constitution
and the constitutions of the various states require "just compensation"
wherever the interest of a person is taken under the power of eminent
domain. Among the many interests which must be compensated for
when taken is that of the tenant under a lease. This includes subtenants 7
and assignees of the lease.' s Just compensation must be provided for a
leasehold interest taken under eminent domain.' 9 One of the objects of
this article is to discuss what the tenant must be compensated for, in
order that the compensation be considered just and adequate.
A. The "Market Value" Test
There are no hard and fast rules when it comes to determining the
amount of compensation to be paid for property that is taken or dam-
aged. The compensation, in order to be considered "just," must be a
fair and full indemnification for the loss sustained by the owner.2 0 Such
compensation should be determined on equitable principles, and should
be such as to put the person from whom the interest is taken in as good
a position financially as he would have been if the property had not
been taken.21 The amount awarded should be measured by the owner's
loss and not by what the taker has gained." Generally, the measure of
9 United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954).10 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATrONs, Eminent Domain § 32.13 (3d Ed.
1950).,
11 Moss v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 223 S.C. 252, 75 S.E. 2d 462
(1953).
22 Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 121 N.W. 2d 205 (Iowa 1963);
Orton v. Daigler, 133 Cal. App. 112, 23 P. 2d 831 (1933).
"3Burger v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 64 Nq.W. 2d 73 (1954).
14Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A. 2d 123 (1961); cf. Horn v.City of Chicago, 403 II1. 549, 87 N.E. 2d 642 (1949).
'5 Lagev. Pottowattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W. 2d 161 (1942).
6 U. S. CO ST. amend. V; Wis. CO ST. art. I, § 3: The property of no person
shall be taken without just compensation therefor."
"7Berer Holding Corp. v. State, 26 Misc. 2d 388, 209 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (1961).
'
8 Putney Bros. Co. v. Milwaukee Light, Heat & Traction Co., 134 Wis. 379,114 N.W. 809 (1908).
19 Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198
N.W. 486 (1924).
20 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
2 City of Chicago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666 (1930); In re Gratiot
Avenue, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755 (1940).
22 In re Widening of Michigan Ave., 298 Mich. 614, 299 N.W. 736 (1941).
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compensation in condemnation cases is the fair market value of the
premises taken.
The market value of property has been defined as "the price it will
bring when offered for sale by one who desires, but is not required, to
sell, and is sought by one who desires, but is not required, to buy, after
due consideration of all the elements reasonably affecting value."2 3 When
a leasehold interest is taken, the lessee is entitled to a sum which com-
pensates him for the loss consequent to the taking or injury. 4 This sum
is generally said to be the "fair market value"' 5 or the "fair rental
value" 6 of the unexpired term of the lease, less any rent agreed to be
paid by the lessee.27 Stated another way, the lessee's compensation is
the "rental value over the rent reserved." ' Under this method of de-
termining compensation, the problem of whether a loss has been suf-
fered by the lessee depends upon whether the rental value of the lease-
hold estate exceeds the rent reserved for the balance of the term.2 9
In most jurisdictions, the taking of the entire property in condemna-
tion proceedings releases the tenant from liability for subsequently ac-
cruing rent.30 This means that if the lessee had made a "bad bargain"
and the fair rental value of the premises was less than the rent re-
served, he would be released from his obligation to pay the rent and
the lessor would have no recourse against him. If he had made a "good
bargain," the lessee sustains damage and must be compensated there-
f or.31 For example, if the rental value or market value for the remainder
of the lease term was determined to be $5,000 at the time of the con-
demnation, and the rental obligation was $4,500, and the total obliga-
tion was eliminated, the lessee's compensation would amount to $500.
The "market value" approach will compensate for any appreciation in
the value of a leasehold which is covered by a long-term lease providing
for a specified amount of rent.
The above rule applies whether there is a total or a partial taking.
The formula in either case is the difference in market value before and
2329 C. J. S. Eminent Domain § 137 (1941). See also Onego Corp. v. United
States, 295 F. 2d 461 (N.D. Okl. 1961).
24 Departmenf of Public Works v. Bohne, 415 Ill. 253, 113 N.E. 2d 319 (1953).
25 Commercial Delivery Serv. v. Medema, 7 Ill. App. 2d 419, 129 N.E. 2d 579(1955) ; United States v. Advertising Checking Bureau, 204 F. 2d 770 (N.D.
Ill. 1953).
26 In re Cross-Bronx Expressway, 195 Misc. 842, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 55 (1948).
27Minsk v. Fulton County, 83 Ga. App. 520, 64 S.E. 2d 336 (1951). See also
notes 25 & 26 supra.
28 Riebs v. Milwaukee County Park Comm'n, 252 Wis. 144, 31 N.W. 2d 190
(1948); Fiorini v. City of Kenosha, 208 Wis. 496, 243 N.W. 761 (1932).
29 Note 26 supra.
30 "The general rule is that the taking of the entire demised property in con-
demnation proceedings releases the tenant from liability for subsequently
accruing rent, but the taking of only a part of the leased property does not
affect the tenant's liability to pay rent. Notwithstanding the proceedings in
eminent domain, the tenant remains liable for rent until actual eviction." 52
C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 483 (1941).
31 Kafka v. Davidson, 135 Minn. 389, 160 N.W. 1021 (1917).
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after the taking, reduced to the extent that the tenant is relieved of the
obligation to pay rent on the lease. The obligation to pay rent is an im-
portant factor where there is only a partial taking, due to the fact that
many jurisdictions hold the tenant liable for the entire rent,32 although
some courts have required a reduction in rent proportionate to the
interest condemned.33 Where the tenant is still obliged to pay rent, some
allowance is generally made for this continued obligation. Where only
a part of the leasehold is taken, the measure of damages is said to be
"the difference between the fair market value of the entire leasehold
estate and the fair market value of the portion thereof not taken. '34
B. The "Intrinsic Value" Test
The majority of jurisdictions continue to apply the "market value"
test as the measure of damages for the taking of a leasehold. There
have, however, been a few instances where it was noted that this test
might not apply to all leaseholds-a recognition of the fact that all
leaseholds do not have a "market value" as the term is commonly de-
fined.35 The United States Supreme Court in the case of United States
v. Petty Motor Company36 admitted that the market value test was often
unsatisfactory:
The Constitution and the Statutes do not define the meaning of
just compensation. But it has come to be recognized that just
compensation is the value of the interest taken. This is not the
value of the owner for his particular purposes or to the con-
demnor for some specific use but a so called 'market value.' It is
recognized that the owner often receives less than the value of
the property to him but experience has shown that the rule is
reasonably satisfactory. Since 'market value' does not fluctuate
with the needs of the condemnor or condemnee but with the
general demand for the property, evidence of loss of profits,
damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other such
consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation pro-
ceedings.
Although the Petty case"7 involved the taking of a fee, the inadequacy
of the market value test is found more frequently where leaseholds are
condemned. Leaseholds are not ordinarily the subject of sale on the
market and they vary so much in the length of term, rent, and other
particulars, including the use to which the property is put by a par-
ticular lessee, that the market value is often an unsatisfactory test of
the value to a tenant of a leasehold interest. Standing alone, it is no
test t all, as some leaseholds may have no market value at all.35 Where
32 Note 30 supra.
3351 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 98 (1941).
34 Kafka v. Davidson, supra note 31. See also Fiorini v. Kenosha, supra note 28.
35 Note 23 supra.
36 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
7 Ibid.
3sDes Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, supra note 19.
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a lease has no market value that can be proved under the usual methods
of proving market value, it is proper and necessary to prove every
factor and element showing the actual or "intrinsic value" of the lease-
hold.39 Where the property condemned has no market value, the "in-
trinsic value" test has been applied. 40 In view of the many peculiarities
of the leasehold interest, which makes it difficult to establish a market
value, it would seem to be a reasonable view that the actual or "intrinsic
value" is the best available test to determine damages to the lessee.
III. PARTICULAR ITEMS OR ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE
There are many items or elements of damage which are considered
when arriving at the amount of compensation. These items are often
peculiar to a given set of facts, and it would be inappropriate to discuss
them in general terms. There are some items or elements, however,
which are considered in most of the cases involving the condemnation
of leaseholds, and these will be discussed here. Most of the factors con-
sidered below are only considered as evidence bearing on the value
of the leasehold, but some are awarded as items of substantive damage,
separate and distinct from the market value.
A. The Option to Purchase
Generally an option to purchase does not give the lessee an interest
which entitles him to compensation. 41 There are, however, some cases
which hold that the lessee should be compensated for the value of the
option. The value of the option is stated to be the difference between
the condemnation award and the price stated in the option. 42 If the
option is exercised before condemnation, there is no doubt that the
condemnation award goes to the lessee purchaser; but where the option
is exercised after the condemnation, some cases allow the holder the
damages awarded, less the purchase price.43 In other cases, the option
is just an item to be considered in determining the market value of
the lease.
44
B. Option to Renew Lease
The value of the right to renew is considered by most jurisdictions
in determining the market value of the interest taken by eminent do-
main.45 The option to renew, in effect, extends the remaining term of
the lease.46 For example, where a tenant has a lease with an option to
39 Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85 (1948).4oGraceland Park Cemetery Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 608, 114 N.W. 2d
29 (1962).
41 In re Water Front, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927). See also In re Cross-
Bronx Expressway, supra note 26.
42 In re Water Front, 219 App. Div. 387, 220 N.Y.S. 23 (1927).
4a Nicholson v. Weaver, 194 F. 2d 804 (9th Cir. 1952). See also 23 Tracts of
Land v. United States, 177 F. 2d 967 (6th Cir. 1949).
44 Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 311, 179 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (1958).
45 United States v. 425031 Square Feet of Land, 187 F. 2d 798 (3d Cir. 1951).6 Department of Public Works v. Bohne, supra note 24.
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renew for another ten years, the ten years will be added to the re-
mainder of the lease in determining the market value of the lease. In
and of itself, the option to renew has no compensable value. It is only
when considered as an extension of the term of the lease that the option
to renew has a compensable value to the lessee, and then only to the
extent that it increases the market value of the lease.
C. Fixtures and Improvements
The right of a lessee to compensation for fixtures or improvements
taken or damaged is dependent upon the terms of the lease and the
law in his particular jurisdiction. If a tenant has the right to remove
fixtures at the end of the lease, he is entitled to compensation when
the fixtures are taken.4 7 The tenant also is entitled to compensation un-
der an agreement with the landlord whereby the landlord purchases the
improvements upon termination of the lease.4 8 A fixture or improve-
ment, to be compensable, must be such as would become part of the
real estate if affixed thereto without any agreement as to removal.4 9
An item is not necessarily a fixture merely because attached to the
realty. An item is generally considered personalty unless it is so at-
tached that its removal will cause substantial damage to the realty or
to the thing itself. Mere personalty, even though used in conjunction
with the realty, is generally not compensable at all.50 Trade fixtures are
considered improvements to the realty, and a tenant is entitled to pay-
ment for his trade fixtures on condemned land.5 ' In most cases where
the fixtures and improvements are valued together with the land as a
whole, they are considered to the extent that they enhance the value of
the land to which they are affixed. 52 The tenant is not entitled to recover
the cost or diminution in value of the fixture or improvement. His
damages are measured in terms of the increased market value of his
realty.5 3 While most jurisdictions consider the entire appropriation
(fixtures, improvements and the realty itself) as a single entity in de-
termining the market value or rental value of the leasehold interest,
some jurisdictions have allowed the fixtures and improvements to be
valued apart from the realty in determining the rental value.54 In at
47 Ibid.48United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Pa. 1957).49 Brazos River Conserv. & Reclam. Dist. v. Adkisson, 173 S.W. 2d 294 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943).50 Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y. 2d 285, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 105, 189 N.E. 2d 606 (1963).
Cf. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, infra note 58, where tenant was
compensated for items of personalty made useless because the condemnation
put tenants out of business.
51United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 102 F. Supp. 854 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
52 In re Civic Center, 335 Mich. 528, 56 N.W. 2d 375 (1953). See also In re
Condemnation of Lands, 341 Mich. 412, 67 N.W. 2d 49 (1954).
53 State ex rel Willey v. Chun, 91 Ariz. 317, 372 P. 2d 324 (1962).
54 Minneapolis- St. Paul Metro. Airports Comm. v. Hedberg- Friedheim Co.,
226 Minn. 282, 32 N.W. 2d 569 (1948).
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least one case, the value of the fixtures and improvements was added to
the rental value in determining the lessee's damages.
55
D. Cost of Relocation
In determining the lessee's compensation in condemnation cases,
the courts have distinguished between two kinds of "moving costs."
Generally, the cost to a tenant of removing personalty, as distinguished
from fixtures, is not to be considered in determining a tenant's com-
pensation.56 The cost of removing personalty is not awarded as an item
of substantive damage, nor is it considered as evidence bearing upon
the market value of the leasehold. There have, however, been some ex-
ceptions. A Missouri case has hinted that the condemnor should pay
the cost of removing personalty from a right of way.5 7 The Iowa
Supreme Court "made allowance" for personal property that was rend-
ered useless to the lessee when his business property was taken,55 and
some cases even award moving costs as substantive damages.5 9 The
general rule as to personalty is aptly expressed by Nichols in his treatise
on eminent domain :60
In general the Lessee's cost of removing his personal property
from the condemned land is not an element meriting considera-
tion whether such item is considered as a separate, substantive
element of damages or whether it is considered insofar as its
effect upon the market value of the leasehold is concerned. It
has been said that the 'just compensation' to which a lessee is
entitled is measured by the market value of his leasehold. He is
not entitled to more than that because his expenses are increased
in consequence of moving his business to another place. -o
The reasons for not allowing compensation for moving personalty are
that the tenant has to move anyhow, that it is not a "taking" so as to
be compensable under the Constitution, and that the verdict would
otherwise be based on mere conjecture.61 For these same reasons, courts
will sometimes deny the cost of removing and relocating fixtures and
machinery.62 Such costs have also been excluded as merely a "conse-
quential loss" and hence damnum absque injuria.63 Generally, however,
a lessee is entitled to recover the cost of removing and relocating fix-
55 Gafney Press v. State, 206 Misc. 1070, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 512 (1954).
56 Marraro v. State, supra note 50. See also Fiorini v. City of Kenosha, supra
note 28.
5 St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 266 Mo. 694, 182 S.W. 750 (1916).
58 Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 119 N.W. 2d 900 (Iowa 1963).
59 Richmond v. Williams, 114 Va. 698, 77 S.E. 492 (1916).
60 4 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.2471 (2), at 667.
61 Ibid. See also Springfield S.W. Ry. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 158
S.W. 1058 (1913).62 Kafka v. Davidson, supra note 31. See also United States v. Meyers, 190 Fed.
688 (D.C. Conn. 1911).
63 United States v. 27.7 Acres of Land, 214 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Ark. 1963). But
see United States v. 425031 Square Feet of Land, supra note 45, where lessee
was forced to reoccupy the premises for the remainder of the unexpired term
after the condemnor moved out.
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tures.64 Since the value of the fixtures as severed will be decreased to
the extent of the cost of detaching and reattaching them elsewhere,
the cost of such removal is to be considered in awarding damages. 5
To be entitled to compensation for moving costs, a lessee must have
a right to remove fixtures. 66 Where the courts uphold the tenant's right
to compensation for moving costs, the rule favored is that the award
should not be made as an item of substantive damages, but the costs
should be considered in determining the market value of the leasehold
as enhanced by the fixtures.67 Under the favored method, rental value
is determined with the fixtures attached, and the cost of relocation,
because it diminishes the value of the fixture, lowers the rental value
of the leasehold.
E. Loss of Profits
Compensation is not made for loss of profits connected with a busi-
ness conducted on land taken. Such loss is considered merely conse-
quential and hence noncompensable. s This is true even though the loss
is directly attributable to the taking.69 In order for a tenant to receive
compensation for loss of profits due to interruption of business, the
business itself would have to be taken by eminent domain.7 0 A few
cases have allowed damages for loss of profits due to interruption of
business,71 but these cases make up only a small minority. Some juris-
dictions will adjust the market value award to reflect loss of profits on
the theory that the volume of business is directly connected with the
market value." Recovery is never allowed for loss of future or antici-
pated profits.
7 3
IV. DIVISION OF COMPENSATION BETWEEN LESSOR AND LESSEE
When a leasehold is taken under eminent domain, the lessee is en-
titled to his proportionate share.7 4 The compensation is apportioned
between the lessor and lessee according to their respective interests.7 5
64 Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, supra note 19. See
also In re Civic Center, supra note 52.
lit re Gratiot Avenue, supra note 21.66In the Matter of the City of New York, 274 N.Y. 581, 10 N.E. 2d 561 (1937).
67 Shipley v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. R. R., 216 Pa. 512, 65 Atl. 1094 (1907).
See also Riebs v. Milwaukee County Park Comm'n. and Fiorini v. City of
Kenosha, supra note 28.
68 United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 71 F. Supp. 255 (1947), aff'd, United
States v. City of New York, 168 F. 2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948).69In re Condemnation of Lands, supra note 52. See also Fiorini v. City of Ke-
nosba, supra note 28.7o Katonah Lumber, Coal & Feed Co. v. State, 194 Misc. 311, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 696
(1949).
71 Pieratt v. City of La Grange, 171 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
72 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W. 2d 727
(1960).73 In re Slum Clearance, 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W. 2d 195 (1952). See also Cudahy
Brothers Co. v. United States, 155 F. 2d 905 (7th Cir. 1946).
74 Skaff v. Sioux City, 120 N.W. 2d 439 (Iowa 1963).
75 Hockman v. Lindgren, 212 Minn. 321, 3 N.W. 2d 492 (1942). See also Rossi
v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 205, 223 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1961).
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The tenant is entitled to compensation for the taking of his leasehold
interest and the landlord for the taking of his reversion. 6 The total
compensation awarded must cover both the interest of the lessor and
the interest of the lessee. 7 Under the rule of law applied in most juris-
dictions, the total award, including the compensation paid to both the
lessor and lessee, cannot exceed the fair market value of the property
taken .
7
V. COMPENSATION IN WISCONSIN
Prior to the enactment of section 32.19 of the Wisconsin statutes,7 9
the state of Wisconsin followed the "market value" approach in de-
termining just compensation for the taking of property and interests
in property under the power of eminent domain.80 With the enactment
of section 32.191 in 1961, and the revision of section 32.09,82 the strict
market value approach was supplemented by the consideration of other
damages and expenses which the land owner or other interested party
sustained as a result of the taking. The market value, however, is still
the basic test in determining the amount of the award. Where there
is a total taking, the condemnor pays the fair market value.8 3 Where there
is only a partial taking, the compensation is measured by the difference
in the fair market value of the property before and after the taking.8 4
In determining the fair market value, consideration is given to fixtures
and improvements actually taken,8 5 damages resulting from actual
severance of land, including damages to improvements and fixtures
resulting from the severance,86 and other items of damages not dis-
cussed in this article.8 7 In determining its market value, the property is
considered on the basis of its most advantageous use.88 In addition to
compensating for the market value of the interest taken, Wisconsin
also compensates for certain other items of expense or damage where
they are shown to exist.8 9 This additional compensation is made as an
item of substantive damages above and beyond the market or rental
value of the property.90 These additional items are:
76 Pierson v. H. R. Leonard Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 256 N.W. 529 (1934).
7 Fiorini v. City of Kenosha, supra note 28.
78 Ibid.
79 WIs. STAT. § 32.19 (1961).
80 Wis. STAT. § 32.09 (1959). See also Fiorini v. City of Kenosha and Riebs v.
Milwaukee County Park Comm'n, supra note 28.
81 Wis. STAT. § 32.19 (1961).
82 WIS. STAT. § 32.09 (1961).
83 Wis. STA. § 32.09(5) (1961).
84 WIs. STAT. § 32.09(6) (1961). See also Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge
County, 21 Wis. 2d 647, 124 N.W. 2d 631 (1963).
85 WIS. STAT. § 32.09 (6) (a) (1961).
8 6 WIS. SAT. § 3 2 .09(6) (e) (1961).
87 WIs. STAT. § 32.09(6) (b) (1961), loss of access to highway; Wis. STAT.
§ 32.09(6) (c) (1961), loss of air rights, etc.88 Wis. STAT. § 32.09(2) (1961).
89 Wis. STAT. § 32.19 (1961).
90WIs. STAT. § 32.09(5), (7) (1961).
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(1) The cost of realigning personal property on the same site.91
(2) The cost of moving personal property to another site.92
(3) All costs incurred by the owner to finance the purchase of
other property substantially similar to the property taken.
93
(4) The net rental losses in the year prior to the taking of the
property, where such losses were caused by the proposed
acquisition of the property involved. 94
(5) The expense of plans and specifications designed for the
property taken, which are rendered unusable because of the
taking.9"
Wisconsin still refuses to compensate for loss of profits.9
The effect of the Wisconsin statutes on a tenant whose leasehold
interest is condemned would seem to be that his share of the total award
is based on the "rental value" of his leasehold interest, determined as
explained in this article.9 7 The tenant also appears to have a right to
receive his morning costs9" or the costs of realigning his personalty,
where there is only a partial taking.9 9 These last two items of damage
would be awarded as items of substantive damages. It is believed that
moving costs would include the tenant's own labor.' 9 In order to qualify
for compensation for his moving costs, the lessee must be under an un-
expired written lease with a term of at least three years.
VI. COMMENTARY
It is the author's opinion that the only just compensation for the
taking of a leasehold interest is the actual loss suffered by the lessee
as a direct result of the taking. The fair market value or rental value
test compensates the lessee for any appreciation in the rental value
of the leased property, but this compensation is too often insignificant
when compared to the loss the lessee incurs as a result of moving ex-
penses and, in the case of the commercial lessee, the loss of profits due
to interruption of business.
The argument against compensation for moving expenses is that
the tenant would have to move anyhow and he should not expect to be
reimbursed for this expense when he places personal property on leased
"' Wis. STAT. § 32.19(1) (1961).
92 WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2) (1961). A tenant, to receive compensation, must have
a written lease with a term of at least three years. This item of compensa-
tion has a ceiling of $150 for the cost of moving from a family residence
and $2,000 for the cost of moving from a farm or other' non-residential site.
93WIs. STAT. § 32.19(3) (1961). Property taken must have been subject to
a bona fide mortgage or be under a bona fide land contract.
94 Wis. STAT. § 32.19(4) (1961).
95 Wis. STAT. § 32.19(5) (1961).96 Dusevich v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 260 Wis. 641, 51 N.W. 2d 732
(1952); Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124
N.W. 2d 319 (1963).9 7 Kafka v. Davidson, supra note 31.98WIs. STAT. § 32.19(2) (1961).
99 Wis. STAT. § 32.19(1) (1961).10o OpS. Wis. ATr'Y GFui. 166 (1962).
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premises.' 0 ' This argument overlooks the fact that most leases are re-
negotiated at the end of the term, and it is the exception, rather than
the rule, that the commercial tenant is forced to move when his lease
expires. It argues nothing to say that the removal would be necessary
at the end of the lease and therefore there is no damage to the lessee. 0 2
It is pure speculation to say that the tenant will not be able to renew
his lease for another term. Wisconsin has recognized this situation
and provides compensation for the expenses incurred in removing
fixtures'0 3 and personalty.104 In Wisconsin, compensation for the cost
of removing personalty is not available to a tenant with less than a
three-year lease, but this would seem reasonable. In this situation, no
compensation will be made for tenants with a month-to-month tenancy,
a tenancy at will, or a tenancy for a period of less than three years. This
means that while there is no compensation available for the individual
under the standard home or apartment lease, the commercial tenant
will be compensated. It is the commercial tenant who is most seriously
damaged through moving costs, and it is also he to whom the argu-
ment that the cost is an encumbrance of leasing has its weakest appli-
cation.
The second argument against moving costs is that they are an item
not compensable within the language of the Constitution.'0 5 It is the
author's belief that moving expenses incurred as a direct result of the
condemnation of the leasehold are as much a taking or damaging of
the property of the tenant as if the sovereign seized the property di-
rectly. The object of an award is to compensate the owner for what
he has lost. 0 8 By reason of the fact that the lessee incurred moving
expenses due to the taking, he has sustained a loss above and beyond
the "rental value" of his leasehold.
Another argument advanced against the awarding of moving costs
is that any award would be based on conjecture. 0 7 The fear is that
the cost of removal will vary greatly, depending upon the distance
of the move. Wisconsin has placed a ceiling on moving costs, thus elim-
inating the expense of moves over great distances. 0 8 It is the author's
contention that the limit should be placed upon the distance moved and
not upon the cost. Compensation should be made for all reasonable and
necessary moving expenses caused by condemnation. By setting a ceil-
ing on the amount paid, the state can predict its maximum liability, but
the person who is forced to move may be compensated for only a frac-
101 Note 61 supra.
102 Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, supra note 19.
o103 WIs. STAT. § 32.09(6) (e) (1961).
10- Wis. STAT. § 32.19(2) (1961).
105 Note 61 supra.
106 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 90 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1949).
107 Note 61 supra.
108 Note 92 supra.
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tion of his actual cost of relocation. Wisconsin has seta ceiling of $2000
for moving expenses incurred in connection with the condemnation of
commercial property. Many commercial lessees could not begin to re-
locate for $2000. It is suggested that by restricting compensation to
reasonable expenses for moves within a reasonable area, a person will
receive "just compensation" for the moving expenses that he incurs
as a result of a taking by eminent domain. By providing for compensa-
tion after the move is made, the condemnor would be able to object to
any expense he deemed unreasonable and adjust the award accordingly.
The interpretation of what is a reasonable expense or distance would
ultimately be for the courts to decide, if a contest evolved.
The loss of profits suffered by a commercial tenant is still treated
by the courts as an item of damage too speculative to warrant compensa-
tion. This writer believes that there are certain losses of profit due to the
taking of the leasehold that are not at all speculative and deserve
compensation. Financial losses due to the interruption of business
caused by the relocation are the profits for which compensation should
be made. This would include the cost of wages paid during the period
of removal and relocation and the provable loss of business during the
period. Injury to the volume of business or to future profits is defin-
itely too speculative to warrant compensation. However, where a business
is forced to cease operation for a period of time due to the taking of its
leasehold interest, it should be awarded its average profit for that period.
Any loss of profit which is directly attributable to the condemnation
of the tenant's business location should be compensated as an element
of substantive damage.
VII. CONCLUSION
The compensation suggested here cannot be called the "intrinsic
value" of the leasehold interest. It would be impossible to set a price on
the intrinsic value to the lessee. The market or rental value is still the
basic test. But market value alone too often does not justly compensate
for what is taken. "Nothing can be fairly termed 'just compensation'
which does not put the party injured in as good a condition as he would
have been if the injury had not occurred."'1 9 The public as a whole
should bear the entire loss or damage due to the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. No one individual should be expected to suffer
for the benefit of the public and not be compensated.
DAVID J. MAcDOUGALL
109 In re Widening of Bagley Avenue, 248 Mich. 1, 226 N.W. 688 (1929).
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